Moral Realism, Error Theory, and Value-Like Appearance
Two realist routes
Foundational realist route: value with normative force is given not merely as pleasure or pain but with epistemic strength comparable to the minimal foundation. This would approach a stopping condition for value inquiry.
Inferential realist route: when phenomenal value, symmetry across subjects, reasons, rationality, consciousness, and cosmic structure are considered together, positing objective value becomes the best explanation. This can justify extremely high confidence in realism while appropriate skepticism remains so long as the conclusion is inferential.
The place of phenomenal value
The "badness" of suffering is at least a strong candidate for a value-like fact internal to a subject. But moving from that to "it has equal weight across subjects" or "all agents have reason to reduce it" requires additional bridges.
Phenomenal value can therefore be treated as major evidence for realism while still being distinguished, for now, from foundational objective normativity itself.
If error theory is true
If there are no objective normative facts and moral discourse systematically presupposes such facts in error, value inquiry is no longer the search for a hidden true morality. But inquiry remains into actual evaluative structures of subjects, institutions, experiences, and the conditions under which future values can be constructed and revised.
Implications for the Core
The Core does not settle realism versus error theory in advance. If realism is true, it investigates both foundational presentation and inferential discovery. If error theory is true, it investigates the conditions for more reflective construction of values.
Even if inferential realism becomes overwhelming, the key distinction remains: do not identify inferential confidence with irreversible epistemic lock-in.